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The 2015 refugee crisis in Europe was a humanitarian, le-
gal, and logistical crisis that resulted in military presence at 
borders. In this paper, all the elements of the refugee crisis 
that could legitimise or denounce the use of military forc-
es to protect state borders will be analysed. Governments 
have international obligations to protect refugees as well 
as to provide security for their citizens, and these obliga-
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tions came into conflict during the crisis. The refugee crisis 
challenged not only international law, but also EU poli-
cies. Possible solutions included accepting all refugees and 
closing the borders, and somewhere in between those the 
army was considered as a tool. A comprehensive answer to 
the legitimacy of army forces at borders will be offered. To 
conclude, Hungarian, Slovenian, and Croatian legislation 
will be discussed, with an emphasis on problems that could 
arise from the differences in these legislations.
Keywords: refugee crisis, military, army, borders, Schengen, 
EU, migrations 
1. Introduction
In the midst of the refugee crisis of 2015–2016 some European countries 
decided to call upon their armies to serve and protect their borders. At the 
time nobody was sure what exactly the armies were doing or what their 
responsibilities were meant to be at state borders. The following questions 
arose: (1) was Europe closing its gates to refugees and was the purpose of 
military presence to strengthen this position and deny the refugees pas-
sage, or (2) was its role supposed to be merely supportive and subsidiary? 
The situation was highly troubled because there were several elements 
that caused confusion and even panic amongst European citizens. There 
were no clear signs of any distinct political plan or agenda regarding the 
refugee crisis, no one offered answers as to the extent to which the refu-
gees would be welcomed, which countries they would eventually be situat-
ed in, and how the whole situation would evolve. Soon it was realised that 
among the refugees there were many economic migrants. What was even 
more troublesome, there were also ISIL terrorists hidden in the crowds, 
who were exploiting the situation and represented a great security threat 
(Smale, 2016). Because of this, international and domestic public opinion 
included problematic comments. Tensions ran high and the public was 
divided between acceptance of refugees and migrants and closing the bor-
ders to them entirely. In such circumstances the governments of Austria 
and Hungary decided to send military forces to the borders. It was then 
that the public started to ask if that was a sign of a militarisation of bor-
ders and if force would be used on people. Suddenly, an increasing num-
ber of comments suggested that military forces should not be sent to the 
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borders. Some of these opinions were based on the view that all refugees 
were welcome, but there were more voices that were directed only against 
the military and the legitimacy of their role in this crisis. That is why this 
paper aims to analyse all the elements of the refugee crisis that could im-
pact the circumstances in which the role of military could be legitimised 
and how this could be done.
First, some statistical information will show the actual extent of the logis-
tical and humanitarian aspects of the refugee crisis. With that in mind, an 
analysis of international legal instruments and state obligations regarding 
their borders will be correlated to the numbers of legal and unlawful en-
tries and the manpower necessary allow the state to execute its obliga-
tions, particularly considering how hard it was to differentiate between 
genuine refugees and economic migrants. It will be explored if this par-
ticular situation and process fall within the scope of the extraordinary. If 
that is the case, in extraordinary times special tools and regimes could be 
recognised as legal and legitimate answers. 
To explain another problematic aspect of military presence at borders, 
cooperation between the army and the police will be analysed to iden-
tify some issues that may occur – in particular, to analyse the possibility 
and the need for the military to exercise police powers at the border. In 
addition, real and hypothetical examples will be used to show a different 
approach to this specific situation and to explain that sometimes idealist 
views cannot solve the problem. That will also help explain the role of 
governments in a refugee crisis. Governments have serious concerns re-
garding refugees and they also need to determine how military forces will 
be used to respond to all issues.
Furthermore, an analysis will show how different European countries re-
sponded to the refugee crisis, in particular Slovenia, Hungary, and Croa-
tia. These countries were selected because they are all EU member states 
and they also share borders with Schengen zone countries and all these 
countries are along the “Balkan Route”. The focus will be on the military 
aspect of their response and how they differed from each other in this as-
pect. This will introduce an EU perspective to the problem but also bring 
up the following question: how is it possible that EU members have such 
different approaches to the Common European Asylum System, which 
is a vital part of the European Agenda on Migration formulated by the 
European Commission (EC) in 2015? The main purpose of the agenda is 
to manage all aspects of immigration more effectively. In other words, the 
EC has medium- and long-term objectives and proposes guidelines in four 
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policy areas: a) reducing incentives for irregular immigration, b) border 
management – saving lives and securing external borders, c) developing 
a stronger common asylum policy, and d) establishing a new policy on 
regular immigration (Schmid-Drüner, 2018). Still, in cases of crisis it is 
hard to achieve a shared approach to the problem, as will be shown in the 
overview of the selected SEE countries.
Bearing in mind the complex situation that mass migration generally is, 
combined with legality and security uncertainties, there are some ob-
jective conclusions around which a comprehensive solution and policies 
should be built. That is why, after a thorough analysis of all the elements 
of the refugee crisis that could affect the military aspect considered in this 
paper, an answer will be offered regarding the legitimacy and justification 
of their use.
2. Literature Overview
Although the topic of the refugee crisis was widely covered and of interest 
to many people and the media, there are few academic articles that cover 
this subject and that of facilitating border security with the use of military 
forces. There are almost no articles that analyse the domestic use of mil-
itary forces at borders, and those that are used in this paper are mostly 
based on examples from the USA. Fortunately, there was no need to ad-
dress this question with regard to the EU and EU borders for a very long 
time. With that in mind and in an attempt to contribute to the quality of 
this paper, examples from other countries were used. All arguments that 
will be provided in this analysis are applicable to the EU, regardless of 
their external (non-EU) origin. There is a distinction between migration 
to the US and the EU refugee crisis, which will be addressed at the end of 
the paper. However, all arguments are valid and they emphasize all pos-
sible aspects and arguments that can be used with regard to the immigra-
tion/refugee crisis and will help provide an overall picture of this problem.
With that in mind, Brennan (2016) was a suitable reading choice as an 
introduction to this complex subject. Some ideas may sound surprising 
but this work contains thoughts on the essence of the topic of internation-
al instruments for refugees. An even better explanation of the Refugee 
Convention as a fundamental legal act can be found in Leiserson (2017), 
which will often be cited in this paper. Moreover, if we are seeking a gen-
eral overview of international instruments, very interesting conclusions 
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appeared in the Nazarski (2008) paper regarding the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A 
recurring question in this paper is whether the use of the military can be 
a legitimate tool in a refugee crisis. All the authors in this paragraph have 
recognised the problem of “interception programmes” and that some of 
them have been conducted with military assistance. Interestingly, anoth-
er recurring thought in this paper is the conflict of “open borders” and 
“closed gates” policies, and it was intriguing to read Papagianni’s (2013) 
work published two years before the refugee crisis, which referred to 
many EU problems. Now, as Staničić (2016) concludes, it is practically 
impossible to impose a “closed gates” policy but the alternative has many 
issues as well.
The core issue of the paper is the use of the military to protect borders. As 
has already been noted, no academic papers have been published on this 
subject in the EU, but Jones and Johnson (2016) provide a good summa-
ry of arguments for and against the use of army forces at the US border 
with regard to militarisation. Tussing (2008) and Chambers (2013) have 
recognised, as did Sanderson (2001), that wars have changed; today there 
are no more “total wars” and the function of the army needs to change in 
accordance with this.
3. International Instruments for the Protection of 
Refugees and Security of State Borders 
To understand this paper, it is of the utmost importance to stress the 
complexity of the situation brought about by the refugee crisis: a crisis 
in which many intertwined problems occurred at all legal and political 
levels of any one country. As has already been noted, incoming waves of 
refugees presented a humanitarian and logistical crisis. In the following 
section many of these problems will be explained and grouped according 
to their source. It is very hard to present the difficulties of the crisis in 
an orderly fashion. The confusion that could arise following this chapter 
could serve as a wake-up call for the reader to see both sides of the crisis 
and to understand that it is impossible to resolve all problems by the book 
from a legal or a logistical perspective. 
The most significant legal source related to the subject is the United Na-
tions Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 
(hereinafter referred to as the Refugee Convention). The convention pre-
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scribes that it is forbidden to expel or return refugees to a country where 
they may face persecution, an exception being if they pose a security 
threat for the host country. Moreover, no refugee or asylum-seeker can be 
penalised because of illegal entry. There are some preconditions for this, 
for example, direct entry from a country where their life is threatened, 
valid reasons for illegal entry, and an obligation to contact the administra-
tive bodies of that country (Lalić Novak, 2016, p. 55). Of course, these le-
gal standards are interpreted more broadly and they are clearly applicable 
to the refugee crisis (Lalić Novak, 2016, p. 55). The Refugee Convention 
was appended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
Article 33 says: “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) 
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where 
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” 
(1951 Convention and Protocol). It has been said in the literature that the 
Refugee Convention was conceived as a functional compromise based on 
international cooperation, a compromise whereby neighbouring countries 
would keep their borders open to refugees to shelter and support them. 
The problem is that neighbouring countries were usually poorer, so dis-
tant countries were to provide funding and help with that burden (Leiser-
son, 2017, p. 194). The real problem started when those “impoverished” 
refugees started arriving at the borders of wealthier countries. No longer 
was it only Cold War dissidents from communist countries applying for 
asylum in the West. That was the point when entry regimes in rich coun-
tries started to shift and the term non-entrée was introduced into legal 
systems (Orchard, 2014, p. 206).
Moreover, the protection of refugee status has evolved and today there 
are several instruments that can be used by refugees. The most recognis-
able one is asylum, which along with subsidiary protection constitutes in-
ternational protection (Croatian International and Temporary Protection 
Act of 2015 and amended in 2017). However, in 2001 the EU enacted 
the Directive on Temporary Protection (Directive 2001/55/EC) as a re-
sponse to mass influxes of displaced persons from the former Yugoslavia. 
The instrument of temporary protection was designed as an exceptional 
measure, meant to provide displaced persons from non-EU countries who 
are unable to return to their country of origin with immediate and tem-
porary protection. It is meant to apply in particular when there is a risk 
that the standard asylum system is struggling to cope with demands of a 
mass influx and risks having a negative impact on the processing of claims 
(Temporary Protection, EU Commission).  
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On the other hand, every country has a right to defend its sovereignty 
and thereby protect its borders from illegal entry or any security threats. 
In addition, European countries have an international (EU) obligation 
to protect their borders from unauthorised entry. This obligation is pro-
scribed by the Schengen system, which extends to Croatia. For this rea-
son, to enter Croatia and Europe legally, an individual must have valid 
traveling documents and enter at specifically designated border crossings 
during scheduled working hours (Regulation (EU) 2016/399). Exceptions 
are always possible and they were made for possible waves of refugees. 
It can be seen that there are two extremities between which sovereign 
governments are trying to balance. On the one hand, there is an interna-
tional obligation to accept all refugees at their borders, without the option 
of sending them back or forbidding them entrance. On the other hand, 
European countries have an obligation to all other EU states to protect 
their borders from illegal entry and thereby protect the safety of their own 
and EU citizens. Somewhere between those two opposite poles, refugees 
are trying to realise their convention-guaranteed rights: safety and securi-
ty. During this “dance” every country has to bear in mind that their treat-
ment of refugees has to comply with the Council of Europe’s Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which 
can be very difficult in a refugee crisis when illegal entries are common 
(Nazarski, 2008, p. 38). For example, articles like Art. 2 (right to life), 
Art. 3 (prohibition of torture and other inhuman or degrading treatments 
or penalties) and Art. 4 of Protocol 4 (prohibition of collective expulsions) 
(European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms) are difficult to follow in a time of crisis. Protection 
under these articles goes far beyond simple words because the European 
Court of Human Rights interprets the European Convention and they 
set the protection bar sky high. It is a great achievement that protection 
has been evolving for 50 years but in extraordinary times it is very hard to 
comply with its standards. It has already been said that the refugee crisis 
was not just a humanitarian one, but also legal and logistical.
4. Contemporary Forced and Irregular Migrations 
to the EU along the Western Balkan Route
The exact number of people who entered the EU in the refugee wave in 
2015-16 is quite hard or even impossible to define; however, official and 
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recorded numbers clearly emphasize the seriousness of the situation. In 
2015, 1.26 million people applied for asylum in the EU. The figure rises 
to 2.5 million when 2016 is added (European Parliament, 2017). But the 
most frightening data refer to the 2.3 million illegal crossings that were 
detected (European Parliament, 2017). It could be said that some people 
were detected more than once in the illegal crossings, which is completely 
true. Still, that number is too high to claim the situation was handled well 
and with a plan. Moreover, in 2015 2.2 million people were found to be 
illegally present in the EU (people who had failed to register properly 
or who had left the country of the asylum claim) and the following year, 
in 2016, that number dropped to 984,000 (ibid.). More interestingly, in 
2015, 533,000 people were ordered to return to their country of origin but 
only 43% did, while a year later only half of the 494,000 who were ordered 
to return home did so (ibid.). Even though in 2017 the pressure of refugee 
waves declined along the “Balkan Route”, there were still around 650,000 
first-time asylum applicants in the EU (Eurostat, 2018). In addition, the 
most troublesome data show that in the two and a half years since 2015, 
only in the Mediterranean around 10,000 people have lost their lives try-
ing to reach Europe. Also, 388,000 people were denied entry at external 
EU borders because they were considered economic migrants (EU Mi-
grant Crisis: Facts and Figures, 2017). That should be more than enough 
to describe the intense and unprecedented pressure suddenly exerted on 
the borders of European countries. These data are an obvious indicator of 
a logistical mess that, among other countries, affected Croatia, Slovenia, 
and Hungary. This is when the question of the use of military force arises. 
For example, let us imagine a country where it snows only 2 days a year 
but so heavily that all traffic is paralysed. For traffic to function regularly, 
300 expensive snowploughs would be needed. These snowploughs would 
obviously be in use only two days a year, while the rest of the time they 
would be idle capital. This simple example can easily be transferred to 
Croatia during the refugee crisis. Usually, there are only small numbers of 
migrants, refugees, or other illegal entrants into the country, but suddenly 
there were 800,000 refugees passing through Croatia (Zrinjski, 2016). 
In a regular year, few employees are needed to establish efficient border 
control but in a crisis they are not enough. There is a need to employ more 
people, but these new employees would, after the hard times, become an 
unnecessary surplus – just like those 300 expensive snowploughs. In addi-
tion, it must be stressed that throughout its history Croatia was mostly fa-
miliar with the process of emigration as opposed to immigration. In such 
circumstances, faced with an unfamiliar immigration process and a huge 
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lack of manpower, it is not that difficult to understand solutions for which 
governments reach. As would be expected, most countries turn to the first 
area similar to that of the police and which is usually used to secure help 
in a state of emergency – military forces. 
4.1. Legal Aspects of the Refugee Crisis
It is important to understand that there was no viable legal basis for the 
policy of open borders, insofar as open borders means letting anyone en-
ter without verifying their documents and other necessary legal require-
ments (Peukert et al., 2017, p. 618). It has been said that a country has to 
allow entry to refugees who seek shelter and are in danger in their home 
country. On the other hand, for example, German Basic Law does not 
give the right to grant asylum to a person coming from a country where 
his or her rights are assured by the Refugee Convention (Peukert et al., 
2017, p. 618). Furthermore, the obligation in the Refugees Convention 
to accept people is not definitive (Leiserson, 2017, p. 216) because there 
is an exception regarding security threats. Also, all EU states have an ob-
ligation to check the credentials of people entering the EU at its external 
borders, especially given the security risk behind terrorist threats. This, 
however, does not mean that countries have to close the gates because 
there are possible threats; it just emphasizes that there is an obligation to 
check every individual in the process of providing security and shelter for 
refugees. 
Public perception often characterises the European Union as a slow 
bureaucratic giant that is not prepared or not even capable of creating 
mechanisms for quick reactions to protect its vital interests. Long before 
any refugee crisis, there were already problems in the EU regarding com-
mon migration policies. Migration was a subject regarding which member 
states would call on their sovereignty and proclaim that they knew what 
was best for their country (Nazarski, 2008, p. 39). The final result was a 
compromise where the “EU had a clear competence, such as in a case of 
visa policy, for the rest it has limited itself to a mere coordinating role of 
disparate national actions of willing member states” (Papagianni, 2013, 
p. 293). Illustrating how slow the EU really is, an extract from the Papa-
gianni paper is interesting insofar as she detected that EU policy “is to a 
large extent a series of either unrelated or overlapping initiatives with no 
proper follow up, or attempts to react to ad hoc problems and is largely 
focused on security related aspects.” (Papagianni, 2013, p. 294). In ad-
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dition, she proposed tighter cooperation between EU members because 
they had failed to react to the small inflow of people during Arab Spring 
(Papagianni, 2013, p. 298). Interestingly, the paper was written in 2013, 
two years before the real crisis, and with plenty of time to create a suitable 
mechanism. 
To conclude this section, there was an evident lack of a common EU 
mechanism, which created a void filled with uncertainty. This resulted 
in EU border countries “washing their hands of the matter” and going 
with their variation of the “open borders” policy whereby they did open 
the borders but just so the refugees could transition further into the EU. 
They had no legal basis for that policy and there were procedural mistakes 
which resulted in an infringement procedure against Croatia (Europe-
an Commission, 2015). It can be said that governments can violate not 
only the rights of refugees but also of their own citizens and other EU 
members by reluctantly discarding international obligations and security 
checks. It is clear that the EU had an extraordinary response to the refu-
gee crisis where there was no rule of law and the result was extraordinary 
legal uncertainty.
4.2.  Logistical Aspects of the Refugee Crisis
The legal obligations have been explained and a metaphor of how the Ref-
ugee Convention was conceived has been presented. It was meant to be a 
compromise between the already developed and still developing countries 
whereby they would share the burden, one side taking on the financial re-
sponsibilities and the other the logistical ones. If we assume that refugees 
want to go directly to the more developed and wealthy countries, is that 
a problem? Moreover, what if transit countries decide that it is better for 
them to transfer refugees than to have them at their doorstep, trying to 
proceed by force? Can developed countries deny them entry? 
It was stressed that the public and, most importantly, experts said that no 
country could easily refuse or return a refugee, no matter where he or she 
comes from or through which country he or she has passed. But is that so 
universally true? Do refugees have a right to choose where they will be refu-
gees? No one can dispute the rights they have and it truly is an international 
obligation to provide them with safety, security, and health necessities. Yet 
if a person decides that they do not want to be a refugee in a poor country, 
but rather a refugee in a developed state on another continent, do they be-
come an economic migrant because of that “reasoned” decision? If that is 
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allowed, there is a very thin line between being a refugee and an economic 
migrant. The health and help standard that would be offered to refugees 
is vastly different in developing countries surrounded by war and in devel-
oped western countries. Consequently, enormous obligations and burdens 
could befall rich countries because there have been 50 million displaced 
people in the world since 2014 (Brennan, 2016, p. 51) and only 15% of the 
refugees have reached Europe (Nazarski, 2008, p. 41). If they all arrived in 
developed countries, nobody could guarantee the social systems of these 
countries would sustain a high standard of providing help to such numbers 
of people. Comments in the literature say that despite the enormous prob-
able burden that could befall rich countries, they have a moral obligation 
to open their borders in a world where inequality between states has been 
much reduced (Brennan, 2016, p. 53). Their starting point is a perspective 
of western countries’ “illegitimate privilege” represented by the wealth of 
their countries, which is why they need to open their borders (Brennan, 
2016, p. 53). The real question is to what extent this principle is just a noble 
wish instead of a realistic foundation for immigration politics. Even if we 
assume that countries could follow up on that idea, it is clearly inapplicable 
at a time of huge refugee waves and crises. It bears repeating that there are 
50 million displaced people in the world and creating systems that could 
sustain inflows of this volume is nearly impossible.
That is the main reason why developed countries look for ways out of ref-
ugee crises but it is questionable if the way they are going about it is legal. 
For example, Australia came up with the “stop the boats” policy, whereby 
they stopped refugees before they reached Australia and offered them re-
settlement in less desirable countries like Nauru and Papua New Guinea 
(Brennan, 2016, p. 54). The Australian government interprets interna-
tional law in the way that refugees have the right to seek a country and 
invoke asylum procedures, but no one has the right to enter or remain in a 
country in which they are not a national (Brennan, 2016, p. 57). The EU 
has also had interception programmes whereby they tried to stop boats 
coming from Africa or deals with Turkey as part of which the EU provides 
financial support and in return Turkey does not let refugees through (Lei-
serson, 2017, p. 208). It is a legitimate question if it is justified to publicly 
announce that you are in compliance with international laws, while simul-
taneously making deals in the background with countries such as Turkey, 
Libya, and Egypt, which will stop refugee inflows even when the refugees’ 
rights are being breached (Nazarski, 2008, p. 41).
The logistical aspect on a global scale has been presented but there are 
even simpler examples of logistical concerns regarding massive waves of 
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refugees regularly arriving at state borders. Usually, there are no major, 
extraordinary shifts at state borders in times of peace. For that reason, 
border police have the number of personnel sufficient to do their prima-
ry duty and monitor possible instances of illegal entry into the country. 
In Croatia, that number amounts to 4,700 policemen along the 2,300 
km of external land border (Staničić, 2016, p. 28). What happens in ex-
traordinary situations when the scope of border police work exceeds their 
personnel capabilities – for example, in a refugee crisis? To exemplify, 
the land border between Croatia and Serbia can be analysed as proof of 
the extraordinary conditions in a refugee crisis. The land border between 
Croatia and Serbia is approximately 300 km long. In the event of a “closed 
gates” policy, refugees and migrants would have to group at one country’s 
border. Let us say that happens along the 300 km of the Croatia–Serbia 
border. Official numbers state that 6,500 refugees crossed that land bor-
der daily (HINA, 2016). With that intensity, in two weeks there would 
be around 100,000 refugees. If that number were distributed along the 
length of the land border, it would mean one refugee every three meters 
along the Croatia–Serbia border. It is impossible to imagine how 4,700 
police officers could stop so many refugees from possibly entering Croatia 
illegally. Once again, that is the number of police personnel for the whole 
country, not just the Croatia–Serbia border. 
Furthermore, once the refugees have entered Croatia, they would need 
help settling in and acquiring basic health necessities. The government 
should not count on the support of civil society or international organisa-
tions, and it would need to ensure enough people to provide refugees with 
basic help. It is obvious that EU countries were not equipped with enough 
personnel to cope with the refugee crisis. Some may think that this would 
be a sound reason to close the border, otherwise their country may end up 
overwhelmed by the chaotic refugee inflow. This just shows that Croatia, 
for example, was not only unprepared to stop illegal entries, it was unpre-
pared to logistically help refugees in an efficient way. However, we must 
not forget that all states have an international obligation to help refugees 
who ask for aid at their borders, if they are not a security threat. That is 
why closing the borders is not the right response, but enough personnel 
to comply with international obligations is a solution. 
This argument should offer a new perspective on military forces at state 
borders. It is an easy and justifiable reason why governments call upon 
military forces to serve at country gates. Clearly, military forces are linked 
to connotations of war; therefore, their jurisdiction, mission, and goals 
must be clearly presented to the public and to refugees. The following 
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section will analyse different scenarios in which military forces could serve 
at borders and most importantly – if the military can be a justified means 
of imposing a “closed gates” policy.
4.3.  Can EU Member States have a “Closed Gates” Policy 
and use the Military to Impose it at the Border?
There are two main starting points for this argument. On the one hand, 
countries have a legal commitment to aid and allow entry to every refugee 
at their border. On the other hand, no sovereign state needs to tolerate il-
legal entry or allow entry to possible security threats or economic migrants 
pretending to be refugees. These two main principles can easily come 
into conflict. In the midst of a great wave of refugees, these two starting 
points may easily clash, with two possible outcomes. The government can 
recognise the extraordinary situation and lack of personnel to handle a 
refugee crisis and decide to ignore the security threat and allow everyone 
at the border entry. In that case, the government has ignored its legal ob-
ligations and has possibly allowed many economic migrants and possible 
terrorists entry. In case of the second decision, the country can decide to 
ignore its obligation to grant asylum to refugees, but by closing its gates it 
makes sure no terrorist or “unwanted” economic migrant can enter. 
Military forces could be used to impose both solutions, but to what ex-
tent can that be legal and legitimate? In the first case, the borders are 
open and the military (if there is legal ground in the legislation for their 
actions) can be used to provide refugees with logistical help, particularly 
if that standard of help could not be achieved otherwise because of a lack 
of personnel. That kind of use is legal and legitimate. Prior to answering if 
the military can be used to impose the second solution, the “closed gates” 
policy, the reality of that policy must be tested. 
That test can effectively be carried out using the example of the refugee 
crisis in Croatia. It has been said that the refugee inflow reached 65,000 
people a day at the Croatia–Serbia border. If the borders had been closed, 
there would have been more and more refugees waiting every day. It must 
be borne in mind that refugees from Syria had crossed half the world to 
get to the gates of Europe, and they would not just have turned around, 
which is understandable from their point of view. In a matter of a few 
weeks there could have been hundreds of thousands of refugees at the 
state border, all eager to continue their journey to the security of the 
EU. In that situation, too many refugees could have grouped together 
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and it would have been impossible to restrain them from continuing on 
their journey. No fences, personnel, or policy would have stopped them. 
The earlier example of 100,000 refugees at the Croatia–Serbia border is 
a good test. The refugees could spread out so that there is one person for 
every 3 meters of the Croatia–Serbia border. At some point, some would 
go past the fences and patrols and soon a great number of refugees could 
follow, particularly if they grouped together and spread to other unsuper-
vised sections of the border (Staničić, 2016, p. 28).41 The army could be 
sent to reinforce the border and stop the refugees, but as their numbers 
increased so would the pressure on the border. Naturally, the force that 
the army would have to use to apprehend refugees would increase as well. 
At some point, lethal force might be needed to stop the refugees. The 
scenario of the armed forces shooting at refugees can be easily described 
as a war on refugees. That is the breaking point at which the use of the 
military at the border becomes excessive and questionable. 
A country could close its borders for safety and security reasons. It could 
say that the refugee inflow is too great for the country to handle its inter-
nal and international border obligations. This could be used as a reason 
to temporarily close the gates and send military forces to impose the rule 
of law at the border. The possibility of a great number of terrorists hidden 
in waves of refugees does exist and in that scenario the use of the military 
to close the gates is legal and legitimate. However, what if it were neces-
sary to use lethal force against refugees to assure border integrity? If that 
possibility is not acknowledged in a refugee crisis, then international ob-
ligations of security and safety at the borders, known as “the rule of law”, 
cannot be acknowledged either. This means that the only solution in a 
refugee wave is to let them through and risk the security and safety border 
obligations imposed by the EU. That decision would not require military 
forces at the border, nor any of the attendant questions and problems.
5.  Distinction between Police and Army Forces 
with Regard to Border Competence
Arguments that indicate the seriousness of the refugee crisis have been 
shown. No country could respond to such a crisis in an orderly fashion 
41 Staničić reached the same conclusion regarding the impossibility of the “closed 
gates” policy in the work cited here.  
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with the personnel they normally have at their disposal. The issue of call-
ing on military forces and possible reasons for doing so have been raised 
both by the public and in this paper. Still, whenever such a suggestion is 
made, it receives a strong response. To indicate all the benefits and possi-
ble problems arising from military interference, both sides of the proposi-
tion must be examined.
5.1.  Arguments Against Military Forces at Borders
The general public commonly associates the military with assault guns and 
war zones but are such perceptions enough to prevent the idea of military 
forces at borders, or are objective and reasonable arguments required as 
well? As this research has shown, there are a few arguments that would 
oppose the justification of using military forces in this case. Primarily, 
arguments against the military at borders are connected to the basic sepa-
ration between the army and the police. Military forces have traditionally 
been used to attack or defend other countries in wars, far away from the 
country they serve. Their second main duty was to defend the sovereignty 
and people of their home state from external aggressions. Only the police 
was meant to constitute a legitimate force to impose the laws and will of 
their own government – not the military. That is why armies cannot serve 
at borders and impose the rule of law of the state they serve. 
Historically, police has dealt with internal threats, contained and stopped 
riots, and enforced the legal regime, but with less force than the military 
in order to soften and hide the use of sovereign power (Jones & Johnson, 
2016, p. 189). If armies were allowed at the border, that would be charac-
terised as the militarisation of borders. Consequently, the militarisation of 
borders is part of a broader process to militarise state authorities, which 
can never be a positive matter for citizens and democracy (Jones & John-
son, 2016, p. 189). Following terrorist attacks in the USA, the distinction 
between the competence of the army and the police started to lose impor-
tance in favour of militarisation. However, US citizens do not want their 
soldiers to be policemen nor do they want policemen to be soldiers: a 
deeply ingrained and inexplicable mindset identified by Tussing (Tussing, 
2008, p. 4). There is one historical argument that could explain the US 
mindset – the Posse Comitatus Act, a federal law that sets the limits with-
in which army personnel may execute law enforcement activities at home 
(Chambers, 2013, p. 12). It was originally introduced in 1878 to prevent 
the federal army from imposing legislation on the southern states but took 
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on a different notion over time. Today, it serves as the main argument 
in the USA against the use of the military in domestic tasks. Chambers 
(2013, p. 13) attributes that thought to public aversion to the involvement 
of the army in state jurisdiction and to the desire of military leaders to 
withhold their personnel from participating in domestic emergencies.
There is significant evidence for border militarisation in the EU as well. 
For example, interception programmes at external EU borders were con-
ducted by military or paramilitary groups from non-EU countries (Jones 
& Johnson, 2016, p. 193). Also, images from Hungary in the midst of the 
refugee crisis are hard to forget. Hungary built a “110-mile-long fence” 
along their border and used extreme measures against refugees and mi-
grants (ibid). In addition, Jones and Johnson stress that US Border Patrol 
agents shot and killed 28 people from 2010 to 2014, while there were 
20,000 deaths at EU borders over the past decade (ibid, p. 195). It is clear 
that roles of both the police and the military are changing. The extent of 
the change is still unknown but the number of deaths is on the rise, along 
with budget provisions for “border militarization” (ibid, p. 191).
5.2.  Arguments for Military Forces at Borders
The world is changing and becoming a smaller and faster place day by day, 
with the aid of technology and human progress. Many connected issues 
are progressing and new challenges are emerging. Harsh developments 
have affected borders as well. The old system of borders and sovereign 
states is challenged by cross-border movements of capital, goods, and 
people (Jones & Johnson, 2016, p. 195). In addition, new threats, like ter-
rorism, have arisen and state borders have been transformed into sites of 
military security activities, focused on preventing those who present a vio-
lent threat from entering (ibid, p. 187).  Total wars are now a thing of the 
past and the function of the army is shifting in accordance. For example, 
refugees have been used as tools in modern warfare many times, which is 
why they have been characterised as a security threat (Sanderson, 2001, 
p. 121). Therefore, the function of the army should shift towards refugee 
management and consequently the protection of state borders. 
Studies have shown that the majority of migrants who attempt to enter 
the United States illegally eventually succeed. Generally, they are appre-
hended more than once prior to their successful entry (Chambers, 2013, 
p. 11). According to data, it is estimated that the odds for apprehension in 
any illegal crossing in 2011 were just 20 per cent (Chambers, 2013, p. 11). 
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The best instrument for the prevention of illegal entry into a country is the 
physical presence of people. Most countries worldwide already have the 
necessary personnel in their military branches (Chambers, 2013, p. 20). 
While the functions of the army outside the country are being reduced, a 
moderate shift in their personnel duties to border security could be a good 
move. Otherwise, it is not logical to expect of the public to justify the 
duplication of government assets in the form of additional police officers, 
if the military has sufficient resources to fulfil the assignment. (Tussing, 
2008, p. 16). 
Moreover, when a crisis breaks somewhere in the world, the public and 
governments easily justify the use of their own armies to intervene in a 
country halfway across the globe. In other words, they see no major prob-
lems in employing their military personnel to breach another country’s 
sovereignty under the pretence of helping the local citizens. For exam-
ple, reports clearly indicate that when armies are used outside domestic 
territory, in a humanitarian refugee crisis, there is always an additional 
agenda (Weil, 2001, p. 80). Frequently, such military interventions end 
up breaching a country’s sovereignty or individual human rights (Weil, 
2001, p. 82). Still, humanitarian and refugee crises cannot unfold with-
out the presence of the military, helping civil organisations. Their role 
has often been portrayed as that of a “norms entrepreneur” whereby they 
“established a policy of consensus around the protection of the forcibly 
displaced, their individual rights protection and created an ethic of inter-
vention” (Weil, 2001, p. 84). A simple conclusion emerges: if the military 
has become an inherent element of providing refugees with help abroad, 
why should they not they assist in the same duties at home? Although the 
help of the military is always considered a last resort solution, under the 
proper legislative circumstances military intervention could steer a refu-
gee crisis in the right direction. Simply stopping illegal entry and helping 
with the logistics of refugees seeking asylum would result in fewer con-
cerns and problems.
In a refugee crisis there are always large groups of people crossing bor-
ders and often it is hard to implement the rule of law and cooperate with 
them. Experience has shown that in such crises there is a need to enforce 
governmental rules. While enforcing power over a group of people like 
refugees, “the real nature of [a] dynamics of violence” exists and must 
be recognised (Sanderson, 2001, p. 123). Otherwise, governments will 
not be prepared and if they do not impose the rule of law at EU borders, 
chaos may result. However, to perform a military intervention that would 
be legal, legitimate, and moral, some preparations are required. Firstly, 
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military presence and jurisdiction must have a sound and precise legal 
basis (Mason, 2013, p. 3). Legislation that prescribes military presence in 
everyday life must undergo a thorough parliamentary and public discus-
sion. Everyone addressed by that law, both refugees and citizens, should 
know the role of the military in a crisis (Weil, 2001, p. 102).
EU states like Hungary did not negotiate the function of the military at 
the border with the public. In addition to the use of violence, this was one 
reason why the international public and governments condemned the use 
of the military in the refugee crisis. But it is often forgotten or overlooked 
that the EU was militarising the refugee crisis as well, through the EU-
BAM (EU Border Assistance Missions) programme that operates under 
the “Security and Defence” pillar. For example, one of EUBAM activities 
included the training of 500 Libyan military personnel for border opera-
tions and there have been other programmes with EU support that are 
executed by military or paramilitary groups (Jones & Johnson, 2016, p. 
194). Army presence at borders used to be labelled as an anomaly, but 
from what has been demonstrated it is clear that it will be a recurring 
anomaly (Tussing, 2008, p. 14). Therefore, legislation must be adapted to 
new military roles in humanitarian crises, both abroad and at home.
6.  Overview of Selected SEE Countries: Hungary, 
Slovenia, and Croatia
Over the last three years some EU states decided to respond to the refu-
gee crisis by sending military forces to their borders. Hungary, Slovenia, 
and Croatia represent different models of how governments resolved the 
problem of sending army troops to the borders. All three countries are 
EU members and although the asylum and migration system is within EU 
jurisdiction, these states have dissimilar models.
6.1.  Legislation in Hungary
Hungary introduced substantial changes to its legislation governing refu-
gees and border security. Their parliament passed a law that amended the 
Police Act and the National Defence Act. Hungary introduced maximum 
restrictions in terms of granting refugees entry and it also decided to se-
verely oppose any attempt at illegal entry (Dunai, 2015). Consequently, 
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military forces were granted dangerous and serious powers that could be 
used to secure borders and used against illegal refugees. The law allowed 
the army to assist the police in checking passports, controlling the flow 
of migrant traffic, and detaining suspects. However, the law also permits 
military forces to use non-lethal force for purposes of border control, such 
as rubber bullets (Jones, 2015). TV news and reports from the Hungarian 
border in which force was used against refugees or in which people des-
perately climbed across a wire fence were broadcast all around the world 
and raised worried comments everywhere. The Hungarian government 
reiterated their stance on securing borders with no patience for attempts 
at illegal entry. Public comments directed against any harsh powers im-
posed on refugees continued and this showed that any possible solution 
to the crisis would be difficult. With aforementioned comments against 
force at borders, only with great difficulties can someone explain as to 
where is the thin line when the open borders policy actually begins to stop 
tolerating illegal entries and gets in compliance with international borders 
obligations.
6.2.  Legislation in Slovenia
Slovenia amended their Defence Act adding Article 37a, which prescribes 
extraordinary competence for army forces. It says that if the security situ-
ation calls for this, their parliament can, based on a government proposal, 
decide to call on military forces to secure the borders. For the proposal to 
pass, the Slovenian Parliament must vote on it with a two-thirds majority 
(Slovenian Defence Act). Activation of extraordinary competence would 
grant the following powers to the military at the borders: 1) issuing warn-
ings, 2) giving instructions, 3) temporary apprehension, 4) control over 
groups of people. These powers are usually not within the competenc-
es of the military, but if the government/parliament proposes thus, they 
can act upon them for a maximum of three months, unless the powers 
are extended (Slovenian Defence Act from 2015). The amendments to 
the Defence Act came after the crisis “exceeded all manageable possibil-
ities”, but the extraordinary competences were not abused with regard to 
the refugees and the act had a thorough public and legislative procedure 
(Agence France-Presse, 2015). The result of the legislation was an act 
that gives the military adequate powers to help in a crisis, without hidden 
agendas that could militarise the borders or society and provoke serious 
public criticism.
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6.3.  Legislation in Croatia 
Croatia also amended its laws, allowing the military to serve at the bor-
ders, but with considerable differences compared with Hungary and Slo-
venia. The Croatian government proposed and the parliament passed an 
amendment to the Defence Act42 and the Border Control Act43. Art. 62a 
of the Defence Act now allows the military to provide support to the po-
lice in securing the border. The minister of defence suggests the military 
be used, but the government must allow this with prior permission from 
the Croatian president. The army can support the police according to 
the Border Control Act (Art. 5), which prescribes that the military can 
be called to the border because of security or humanitarian reasons. In 
addition, the act clearly says that army forces have to follow police orders 
while serving at the borders.
The background to the amendments in both Hungary and Slovenia were 
security reasons, i.e., the governments realised that the refugee crisis had 
become logistically impossible to regulate in accordance with border secu-
rity obligations. That was the main reason for sending additional person-
nel to the border in the form of military forces: they were meant to fight 
any illegal attempts or threats and help in the arrangement of refugee 
transport across their territory. The same background existed in Croatia, 
but it was unusual that the amendments did not provide the military with 
police powers like in Slovenia. Croatia had had frequent need of military 
intervention in the past and they are called to serve in any extraordinary 
situation of humanitarian and environmental character. Consequently, 
seeing army forces on the front line in extraordinary situations was not 
strange to the public; on the contrary, it was expected that they would 
arrive and provide support. Moreover, the Croatian Constitution (Art. 7) 
allows military forces to aid the police and other public bodies in extraor-
dinary situations. This paper has constantly emphasized the extraordinary 
aspect of the refugee crisis in a legal, humanitarian, and logistical sense. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this paper and to clear up any possible mis-
understanding, the Ministry of the Interior was contacted to determine 
the intentions and goals behind the amendments to the laws described in 
this and the previous paragraph.
42 The Defense Act (Croatian), Official Gazette 73/13, 75/15, 27/16, 110/17.
43 The Border Control Act (Croatian), Official Gazette 83/13, 27/16.
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The correspondence between the author and the ministry intended to 
clarify if there is a possibility for the military to use force at the border or 
if they can help in any way against illegal activities, and if not, what the 
army’s possible duties at the border are. The questions were sent by email 
and only relevant  information and answers are included in the paper.
The first question said: “In your interpretation of the Border Control Act, 
can military forces exercise police powers at state borders?” The ministry 
responded that “upon providing support to the police with regard to bor-
der security, military forces are not allowed to exercise police powers.” 
This would mean that ministry officials are familiar with the legislative re-
gime and possible consequences if a new wave of refugees were to arrive. 
The second question was: “In the event of a new refugee wave, can mili-
tary forces be used to prevent any illegal entries in Croatia?”. The answer 
says: “Military forces would not be used in tasks and on sites where they 
can be in direct contact with illegal migrants.” Lastly, they resolved the 
question of the duties that army personnel would have at borders, where 
they provided a broad list of possible tasks. For example, the military 
would help with migrant transport, data collection, supervision with and 
without technology, air surveillance, food and water deliveries, help and 
rescue missions, infrastructural works, sea patrolling, and other tasks.44
Now that the EU has already accepted a minimum of 1.5 million refugees 
and migrants, it is fair to ask if a new massive wave of refugees would be 
welcomed, particularly taking into account the interception programmes 
and the EU–Turkey deal. Two EU members in close proximity to Croatia 
have given police powers to the military and if “closed gates” policies were 
to be implemented throughout the EU, they would be prepared to stop 
any illegal attempt to enter their territory. That would mean that under 
the current legal regime, Croatia could easily end up a part of the EU 
frontier which is a hotspot for refugees and migrants. That is not neces-
sarily undesirable if Croatia wants to allow refugees access to its territory 
and to aid them if they seek help. However, the Croatian government 
has repeatedly stated that it does not intend for the country to become a 
refugee hotspot. Even if the military had police powers it would be hard 
to implement a “closed gates” policy, but if that were not the case it would 
be logistically impossible.
44 The responses were provided by the Sector for Public Relations of the Ministry 
of the Interior by email correspondence. There were more questions and a few more were 
answered but only significant extracts were included in this paper.  
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Having analysed all the elements of the refugee crisis that could impact 
on the justification of the use of military forces at borders, a possible solu-
tion is presented. The use of military forces in extraordinary situations at 
borders is legal and legitimate if basic international obligations are com-
plied with. As for the role of the army in the “closed gates” policy, its 
use can be legal and legitimate if the safety of the country’s own citizens 
cannot otherwise be assured. However, as soon as lethal force is needed 
to stop the refugees, i.e., when war is waged on refugees, it is impossible 
to rationalise and justify the use of military forces.
Moreover, the differences between arguments for army forces at borders 
that are articulated in the USA and those in the EU must be stressed. 
The USA is confronted with a continuous and vast migrant inflow. In ad-
dition, in the case of the USA there are mostly economic migrants at the 
border, not refugees like in the case of the EU. Justification for the use of 
the military is not the same; in the USA there are no extraordinary issues 
and the migrant inflow is steady and long-standing. The solution to border 
control does not lie in sending army forces to borders; the use of the mili-
tary should be limited to warfare and extraordinary domestic matters. The 
refugee crisis in the EU was an entirely different issue. Waves of refugees 
numbering millions of people in two years is an extraordinary situation 
that calls for extraordinary measures.
To conclude, some considerations must be emphasized. The refugee crisis 
was a legal, humanitarian, and logistics crisis. The chaotic arrival of so 
many people in the EU raised many questions and uncertainties. Gen-
erally speaking, few solutions were offered and they had divided support. 
Both refugees and countries have obligations and rights. To address this, a 
well-balanced approach to the refugee crisis is needed. For now, wars are 
still being waged, refugees still exist, and only 15% of misplaced persons 
arrive in the EU (Nazarski, 2008, p. 41). If a new refugee wave were to 
reach Croatia and the EU, these governments would experience trouble 
but with right military policies trouble could be avoided. Only if interna-
tional obligations that support some of the “closed gates” policy arguments 
(security and the rule of law) and “open gates” policy arguments (asylum 
protection and integration of refugees) are fulfilled, can a comprehensive 
solution be reached under which both refugees and EU citizens are safe 
and content. To make that possible in extraordinary situations such as 
refugee waves, the advantages of military use must be recognised and the 
military must therefore be properly used.
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THE USE OF MILITARY FORCES IN THE PROTECTION OF THE 
BORDERS AND PREVENTION OF IRREGULAR MIGRATIONS IN 
SELECTED SOUTH EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Summary
The 2015 refugee crisis in Europe was a humanitarian, legal, and logistical 
cri sis. New circumstances gave rise to ideas of calling upon armies to serve at 
bor ders. This paper analyses all the elements of the refugee crisis that could serve 
to legitimise or oppose the use of military forces in the protection of state borders. 
Governments’ international obligations to protect refugees and providing secu-
rity for their citizens came into conflict during the crisis. In an age of terrorist 
threats, the roles of the police and the military are shifting in an unknown direc-
tion, yet these international obligations remain. The refugee crisis challenged not 
only international law but also European Union policies and ethical principles. 
The possible solutions were either to ac cept all refugees or to close the borders 
entirely and somewhere in between these opposing solutions the army was con-
sidered as a tool. Many have emphasized that there is no place for military per-
sonnel at state borders regardless of refugee inflow. Hence, this paper examines 
the arguments for a “military ban”. Furthermore, a thorough analysis follows on 
the legal and logistical legitimacy of army usage at borders. At the end, Hun-
garian, Slovenian, and Croatian legislation are discussed and compared with a 
view to problems that could arise from the differences in the legislation regarding 
possible future migration and refugee inflows.
Keywords: refugee crisis, military, army, borders, Schengen, European Union, 
migrations
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UPOTREBA VOJNE SILE U ZAŠTITI GRANICA I SPRJEČAVANJU 
ILEGALNIH MIGRACIJA U ODABRANIM ZEMLJAMA 
JUGOISTOČNE EUROPE
Sažetak
Izbjeglička kriza u Europi 2015. godine imala je humanitarne, pravne i logis-
tičke aspekte što je dovelo do pojave ideja o upotrebi vojski na granicama. Ana-
liziraju se svi elementi izbjegličke krize koji bi mogli opravdati ili dati argumente 
protiv upotrebe vojske u čuvanju državnih granica. Međunarodne obveze drža-
va da zaštite izbjeglice i sigurnost vlastitih građana dolaze u međusobni sukob 
za vrijeme izb jegličke krize. U doba terorističkih prijetnji uloge policije i vojske 
mijenjaju se u nepoznatom pravcu, ali te međunarodne obaveze ostaju nepromi-
jenjene. Izbjeglička kriza je izazov međunarodnom pravu, ali i politikama i 
etičkim načelima Europske unije. Upotreba vojske je srednje rješenje između pri-
hvata svih izbjeglica i potpunog zatvaranja granica. Mnogi se protive vojnicima 
na državnim granicama neovisno o priljevu izbjeglica. U radu se analiziraju 
argumenti za takvu zabranu vojske. Slijedi detaljna analiza pravne i logističke 
opravdanosti upotrebe vojske na granicama. Na kraju se ispituje mađarsko, 
slovensko i hrvatsko zakonodavstvo pri čemu se posebno ističu problemi koje 
bi zakonodavne različitosti mogle prouzročiti u budućem priljevu migranata i 
izbjeglica.
Ključne riječi: izbjeglička kriza, vojska, granice, Schengenski režim, Europska 
unija, migracije
